Digital Politics in the Diaspora: U.K. Aam Aadmi Party Supporters Online and Offline by Webb, Martin
Webb, Martin. 2019. Digital Politics in the Diaspora: Aam Aadmi Party UK supporters on and
offline. Television and New Media, ISSN 1527-4764 [Article] (In Press)
http://research.gold.ac.uk/26496/
The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please
go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact
the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address:
gro@gold.ac.uk.
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For
more information, please contact the GRO team: gro@gold.ac.uk
Millennial India: Aam Aadmi Party  
 
 
1 
Digital Politics in the Diaspora: Aam Aadmi Party UK supporters on and offline 
Martin Webb 
Abstract 
In 2012 the Aam Aadmi (common man) Party (AAP) made its debut on the Indian political 
scene on a platform promoting ethical politics, anti-corruption action and active citizenship. 
Inspired by the AAP’s call to “change politics” many Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) in the UK 
Indian diaspora joined an international network of groups that provided support for the party 
in subsequent successful election campaigns. This article follows the ways in which digital 
media played a key role in the formation of intense individual attachments to the party, and 
how, for some, it became the means through which disillusionment with the party and its project 
was expressed. By attending to digital politics in the Indian diaspora as it plays out in this 
relatively recent political formation, we can gain a new perspective on the circulations, 
connections and class values through which post-liberalization projects to reform the nation 
are worked on from beyond its borders.  
Keywords: Indian diaspora, Aam Aadmi Party, digital politics, anti-corruption activism, social 
media networks 
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In this article, I draw upon research carried out with supporters of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) 
in the UK Indian diaspora between 2013 and 2016.  Formed in 2012, AAP is a relatively recent 
entrant on the Indian political scene and support for the party from Non-Resident Indians 
(NRIs), particularly in America and Europe, has played a significant role in the party’s 
sometimes spectacularly successful election campaigns.  
Here I will focus on two aspects of the NRI activist experience of digital participation 
in party activities. The first involves the work of activists, particularly during election 
campaigns, who participate both alone and in networked teams in the everyday tasks of 
monitoring mainstream and social media coverage of the party, producing and sharing content 
about their activities and participating in the party’s global calling campaigns. These cyber 
volunteers see their role as counters to the well-funded and organized social media campaigns 
of the opposition parties, in particular the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Rebutting attacks 
in the comments sections of online news reports and sharing videos of speeches by party leaders 
via Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp become part of everyday mobile phone and home 
computer usage. Accounts of the time and effort devoted to this work reveal how AAP 
supporters in the diaspora bring ethnic, and particularly class, identities into play as part of 
their online and offline projects to mobilize support for the party and ‘change politics’ in India.  
The second explores the role of digital media when some supporters become 
disappointed with what they see as the party’s inability to deliver a new kind of politics and 
begin to criticize the party or seek to disengage from it. I look at two examples in which 
committed activists’ faith in the party fails. In one, the activist turns to YouTube to criticize 
the party. In the other, digital engagement with the party via twitter at first provides an avenue 
through which to express disillusionment. However, a social media backlash from party 
supporters follows and the activist’s personal commitment to transparency, openness and 
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building networks that they have sustained over their years of activism is transformed into a 
wish for anonymity and disconnection.  
My attention to the support for the AAP in the Indian diaspora is informed by an 
existing literature on diasporic politics and long-distance ethno-nationalism by scholars of 
transnationalism and globalization (Mathew and Prashad 2000; Rajagopal 2000; Mukta 2000; 
Moorti 2005; Kinnvall and Svensson 2010; Conversi 2012; Zavos 2015). This literature has 
helped us to think about the circuits and events through which NRIs play a part in political 
projects to reimagine India, particularly those of Hindu nationalism, and about the emergence 
of a globalized Indian middle class which is concerned with the preservation of Indian ‘culture’ 
and national integrity.  
Here, in contrast to the focus on the reproduction of an ethno-nationalist politics of 
Hindutva, I look at the ways in which AAP-UK supporters in the diaspora imagine a pan-
Indian concept of the nation which is framed on the one hand by a moral politics of self-
sacrifice and activist commitment that deploys the iconography of the freedom struggle against 
colonial domination, and on the other by the inclusive idea of the nation framed in the Indian 
constitution. This imagination of the nation contains a narrative which blames establishment 
politics for rampant corruption and the disintegration of the post-independence national 
development project (see Udupa 2019). The figure of the aam aadmi, the common person who 
has suffered enough and can act as an individual moral agent in concert with others, is offered 
as an alternative to participation in politics as usual and allows for people with diverse social, 
religious and political identities to associate themselves with the project for change. Thus, the 
AAP-UK emerges as a broad church which can appeal to a diversity of Indian identities within 
the UK diaspora, albeit one which is shaped by the worldview and concerns of middle class 
NRI professionals. It is arguable that the emergence of the AAP in the UK diaspora has been 
partly facilitated by the similarity between its anti-corruption and governance reform message 
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and that of the BJP. Both appeal to middle class Indian discourses about the ‘dirty river’ of 
politics (Harriss 2005) and the possibility of good governance. In this sense the imagined India 
of many AAP-UK supporters, if not necessarily the intellectual leaders of the party in Delhi, 
was perhaps not so very distant in policy terms from the BJP’s 2014 electoral pitch of 
incorruptible leadership, development and “minimum government, maximum governance”.  
For NRI professionals however, not comfortable on the one hand with the ethno-
nationalist politics of the BJP, and on the other with a Congress party discredited by corruption 
scandals, the AAP offered an anti-establishment alternative with a positive agenda for change. 
This interest was then activated through the other clear difference between the AAP and the 
established national parties in India. That was the ‘extraordinary agency’ (Roy 2014, 46) which 
the party offered to activists to build a movement through the performance of individual and 
collective forms of active citizenship, to be the underdog struggling against a well-organized 
and funded opposition. For AAP supporters in the diaspora digital connections offered a means 
through which to participate in and reproduce party action spaces in the UK. Working through 
digital connections AAP UK supporters could imagine themselves as active citizens with a 
global reach, able, perhaps, to participate in remaking India from beyond its borders and 
empowered by new media platforms, professional knowledge and their status as NRIs.  
 
The Origins of the Aam Aadmi Party  
To understand the politics and aesthetics of the Aam Aadmi Party, it is necessary to introduce 
the India Against Corruption (IAC) movement from which the AAP broke away in 2012. 
Operating through idioms and aesthetics of ‘saintly politics’ (see Morris-Jones 1963) the IAC 
reflected both the history of non-party political action in India (Kothari 1984) and the waves 
of anti-corruption action connecting grassroots political movements to middle class concerns 
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about good governance that had emerged in India since the 1990s (Jenkins 2007). IAC activist 
discourse understood electoral politics as part of a corrupt nexus between politicians, public 
officials and business interests that betrayed the aims of the original movement for 
independence from colonial rule. Styling itself as a second freedom movement and deploying 
nationalist imagery, activists gathered behind the figurehead of the veteran social activist Anna 
Hazare (see Chowdhury, Banerjee, and Nagarkoti 2017). The series of spectacular protests 
demanding anti-corruption legislation staged by the IAC across 2011-12 (see Pinney 2014; 
Webb 2014; Bornstein and Sharma 2016), were made all the more forceful by being 
contemporary with the “Arab Spring” (Werbner, Webb, and Spellman-Poots 2014).  
Less public were the organizational efforts behind the protests, in particular the use of 
ICTs and social media strategies to publicize events, build networks and share material such as 
memes and videos (Udupa 2015, 210; Webb 2014; Lal 2017). The IAC organizers’ strategy 
recognized both the increasing penetration of smartphone and computer-based participation in 
social media platforms such as Facebook, and the much wider use by the lower middle and 
working classes of more basic mobile phones which only allowed users to call and send SMS 
messages. Gaining followers and likes on social media was important, but equally so were 
campaigns encouraging people to make a “missed call” to an IAC number to show support 
without incurring connection charges. This allowed the IAC organizers to build a database of 
phone numbers of potential supporters reported to be as many as 14 million (Sharma 2014).  
The progress of the IAC movement was followed keenly within the global Indian 
diaspora. NRI networks became involved in social media campaigns and there were protest 
gatherings at Indian embassies in a number of countries, including the UK. When the IAC 
organizing committee split in 2012 with a faction led by Arvind Kejriwal forming the Aam 
Aadmi Party and contesting elections on an anti-corruption platform, a significant number of 
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IAC supporters in the diaspora followed. Many agreed that the lack of success of the non-party 
political action of the IAC movement could only be overcome by entering electoral politics. 
The AAP also drew in new supporters who had been skeptical of the IAC movement’s 
approach. As Padmini, an NRI software engineer and AAP activist in her thirties working in 
London told me, during an interview in 2014, her husband had been a keen follower of the IAC 
in 2011 but she had seen it as a waste of time as it did not offer an alternative for voters. When 
Kejriwal announced the formation of the AAP she volunteered enthusiastically. Padmini’s 
account of attraction to the political possibility of the new party after the IAC movement was 
repeated by other AAP UK supporters that I interviewed in the UK, such as Fahima and Farooq, 
a young Muslim couple from Andhra Pradesh working in in the UK in IT roles. Speaking to 
them during the 2014 national election campaign, Farooq told me that he had not been tempted 
to join the IAC because it had made no progress. But he had followed Kejriwal very closely 
online and through videos posted on social media. When the AAP was formed, he and Farooq 
quickly became involved. 
Engagement with the new party then was bolstered by a narrative about the failure of 
the earlier movement and the transfer of focus onto a new leader and moral authority figure, 
Arvind Kejriwal, and a new leadership team. Within the diaspora it also involved interaction 
with interested others through a variety of online and offline encounters, and through the 
consumption and production of the party’s digital offering. It is to accounts of these digital 
engagements that I will now turn. 
 
Cyber Volunteers 
The majority of the AAP UK supporters I encountered belonged to a globally mobile workforce 
of middle class ‘techno-professionals’ (Mathew and Prashad 2000, 520; also see Fuller and 
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Narasimhan 2007; Xiang 2008; Fernandes 2000) with a range of citizenship statuses. Some 
were settled in the UK as family units and had held UK citizenship for many years. Some were 
male workers spending long periods working on contracts in the UK but with wives and 
children living with their extended families in India. Other volunteers were connected to higher 
education as postgraduate students or academics, or worked as medical professionals in the 
UK’s National Health Service. In any case, access to and familiarity with digital devices and 
processes was a common factor and volunteers’ mobility and the digitally mediated political 
space that AAP-UK supporters were co-producing became entangled with their family, social 
and working lives. For these people sojourning (Bonacich 1973, 585) in the UK the AAP 
supporters network acted not just as a political activity but also provided friendship and, in 
some cases, accommodation while working away from home. The network also facilitated 
business and other work opportunities between party supporters, some of which have endured 
after connection to the party lapsed.  
As information sheets for potential volunteers circulated by the AAP-UK conveners 
around the time of the 2014 national election campaign show IT skills were seen as a key part 
of the contribution that volunteers might make. These included participating in teams which 
would adopt state level campaigns and provide support to ‘on the ground’ volunteers in specific 
constituencies. Volunteers were called upon to join teams offering web and database 
management, app building, video editing, technology logistic support and ‘HR/volunteer’ 
coordination which mirror the team based but flexible, self-directed and mobile working 
practices of the global IT services industry (Upadhya and Vasavi 2008). ‘Local NRI’ teams 
from different parts of the globe adopted different states with the UK team taking on Kerala, 
Punjab and Maharashtra, sometimes in concert with NRI teams from other locations, such as 
the ‘Middle East’ or Canada. The choice of locations also partly reflected the predominance of 
specific diasporic populations and language communities, such as Punjabi Sikhs, within the 
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UK and other countries. This focus also fed into the ‘calling campaigns’ in which NRI 
supporters would cold call potential AAP supporters in India. These took on particular 
significance as a form of volunteer labor with UK teams taking part in international 
competitions with teams around the globe to see who could log the most calls via an ‘online 
portal’ designed by AAP volunteers in the US.  
 The database of phone numbers used for the calling campaigns was initially comprised 
of contact details of IAC supporters collected during the movement’s campaigns to persuade 
potential supporters to make a no cost ‘missed call’ to an IAC number to show support and via 
SMS and social media campaigns across 2011-12. Controversially these numbers had been 
retained by the AAP media team when it had split from the IAC (see Sharma 2014) and the 
team continued with the strategies developed during the IAC movement to further build a 
support base (see Lal 2017). 
 
(Fig 1. A call campaign leader board used to encourage AAP volunteers during the 2015 Delhi 
Assembly election campaign showing numbers of calls and call locations logged through the 
online portal. Original source http://emc3.aamaadmiparty.org/index.php) 
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As well as working together, teams from different areas and countries would also meet 
online via video conferencing platforms such as Google Hangouts. As part of the 2014 election 
campaign I gathered with AAP UK supporters and teams based in Canada and America for an 
online meeting with Yogendra Yadav, then a leading figure in the AAP, in which he 
congratulated them on their hard work for the party. While we stood in a room in East London 
interacting with Yadav via a webcam link, the teams in the US and Canada appeared in smaller 
screens in the corners of the picture indicating to party supporters both the international level 
of the effort and their collective ability to work across time zones and provide round the clock 
support.  
On a visit to Fahima and Farooq’s apartment in East London during the 2014 Lok Sabha 
election campaign the role of the digital in connecting them to events in India was made evident 
by the number of devices, cables and chargers spread across the table in the living room. Two 
laptops, back to back on the table, were connected to AAP Facebook and YouTube accounts 
and their smartphones were always in hand, buzzing with updates and memes shared across 
Twitter and WhatsApp groups. Fahima explained how caught up their daily lives had become 
with the party’s media streams 
Every day after coming home while we are cooking, we start some videos of the 
Aam Aadmi Party which say what is happening. So, we keep up to date that way. 
[…] Any channel which gives the interview of Arvind [Kejriwal], immediately we 
get updated on Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter. We are just thriving to come home 
to look at those videos (laughs). 
I asked about the labor involved in supporting the party. Farooq spoke passionately about the 
need to counter the mainstream media accounts of the AAP in the run-up to the election by 
connecting directly to people in India via phone calls and social media. He echoed an assertion 
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that I had heard before from AAP-UK supporters that the need for commitment to this work 
was made all the more pressing because of the belief that they were up against a well-funded 
BJP digital media campaign. Farooq assured me that  
‘Narendra Modi […] he has got one office in Hyderabad and that is a 500-crore 
project with the big CCTVs, with big televisions and big monitors. There are some 
13 hundred people in that team and the job of those 13 hundred people is to counter 
people on social media.’ 
In this battle the AAP’s teams were clearly the underdogs, but still, here was a sphere in which 
the diaspora could take an active role in campaigning alongside their busy professional lives.  
He went on to tell me about his daily routine from getting up early in the morning to 
cold call people in particular constituencies using numbers provided by logging into the online 
portal. After that he would leave for work but would continue to monitor and share posts across 
twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. Connecting to AAP activists on the ground in Andhra 
Pradesh, his home state, and organizers in the global network he would attempt to assist with 
logistical problems activists might be having in sourcing campaign materials such as caps or 
stickers.  
Like other AAP UK activists I encountered Fahima and Farooq were particularly busy at 
election times logging into the AAP database containing the contact numbers of potential 
supporters in India and calling to encourage people to vote and volunteer.  In order to make 
these cold calls effective they felt that they had to keep as up to date as possible with media 
events concerning the party. The calling work was not easy. Fahima said that at one point she 
had spent so many hours calling India that one of her ears had started bleeding. Many 
volunteers I spoke to believed that the calling work they did was particularly effective because 
of their NRI status. As Fahima put it: 
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‘It’s like a ripple effect. When we call one they [the party] say it is like calling to 
ten because a call from an NRI is always a privileged one, even today in India. They 
feel it’s a privilege if somebody is calling from London or America and feel really 
excited and happy.’  
What Fahima and Farooq and other AAP-UK supporters are doing is familiar from accounts of 
the involvement of diasporic populations in long distance nationalism as migrants, in this case 
mobile IT professionals, seek ways in which they can help what they perceive as the struggling 
home nation (Mathew and Prashad 2000; Jones 2014). In the political action space that they 
have created in their home they participate in the ‘online nation-talk’ that Udupa (2019) has 
identified as a site of contest between post-Nehruvian liberals and Hindu nationalists in which 
varying aspirations for a ‘new India’ defined by ideas of clean government and technological 
modernity are debated. The service they perform for the party is to try to persuade others that 
the human and natural capital immanent in the nation has been held back by the misrule of the 
established national political parties and could at last be released from the drag of corruption 
and communal politics by a new political movement. For Fahima and the other AAP-UK 
volunteers, educated and successful NRI professionals working for the party are embodiments 
of the human potential of the nation and thus imagined to be influential. 
For some volunteers, bearing witness to their involvement with the AAP online the 
challenge was not so much dealing with attacks from political opponents but rather criticism 
from friends and family. Soman, an IT consultant from Andhra Pradesh in his mid-thirties who 
had been in the UK since 2004, told me that he had never been involved in politics before he 
started supporting the AAP. He was from a Hindu family but had non-Hindu friends and had 
attended a Muslim college. He also had a strong memory of feeling threatened by BJP workers 
visiting his house when he was a boy to collect donations for the Ram Mandir at Ayodhya and 
of his father’s refusal to give money, to any party. Though while he mistrusted political parties, 
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he had always been very patriotic, he said, and had warned his future wife about this when they 
were introduced. As he become involved in the AAP and started posting about it on Facebook, 
he lost many online friends. People also questioned his wife online about why he had become 
involved in politics, ‘this dirty thing’. His continuing, and very public, commitment to the AAP 
became a something of an embarrassment to his family, but due to the potential for national 
renewal that he saw in both the AAP and the leadership of Arvind Kejriwal, he had sustained 
his engagement both online and in time consuming offline organizational work and recruiting 
drives such as the AAP-UK Flame of Hope tour of UK cities (see Flame Of Hope AAP-UK 
2015). 
As we can see from these accounts of volunteer labor and attachment to the party, what 
drives these activists is the sense that established politics is broken but the non-party political 
formations of Indian civil society, here represented by the IAC movement, while laudable and 
necessary, are not sufficient to effect change. As one of the leading figures in the AAP UK 
supporters’ group, often argued the AAP would “change politics” through leading by example 
and linking a strong ethical and moral stance in election campaigns to individual volunteer 
action on and offline.  Inevitably this process has not been straightforward and its working 
through has had significant impacts on both the party and its supporters. It is this emphasis on 
the party’s ability to change politics, and the fall outs caused by it that take us to the next 
section.  
 
Sojourning, Returning and Falling Out 
Srirupa Roy has written compellingly about the ways in which the AAP’s electoral campaigns 
have provided ‘action spaces’ through which volunteers can enact their citizenship, exercise 
agency and become ‘agents of transformational politics’ (2014, 51). She describes how 
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important participating in outreach activities became for AAP activists in India in the run up to 
the 2013 Delhi assembly elections and the pedagogical mission that many educated AAP 
activists felt they had to educate voters, particularly the urban poor, about the problem of 
corruption. As we have seen from the examples above for AAP-UK supporters, and others in 
the global diaspora, digital spaces were very significant in terms of action and outreach. Action 
and engagement with the public in India was effected through the maintenance and use of a 
digital infrastructure inherited from the IAC and developed further by AAP activists, and the 
pedagogical mission partly fulfilled through person to person connections during the calling 
campaigns.  
For many AAP-UK supporters it was also important to participate ‘on the ground’. A 
number of them visited India during election campaigns to volunteer and I encountered some 
of them in Delhi in 2013 before the Delhi assembly elections in which the AAP achieved its 
first success in the polls. A member of the group called Jainath, a man in his late 70s who had 
been settled in the UK since the 1950s but regularly returned to India to do voluntary work, 
was particularly celebrated for his street campaigning work in Delhi and featured in AAP-UK 
YouTube posts of the time (Aam Aadmi Party UK 2014). Some volunteers returned to Delhi 
to take up temporary office roles in specific teams that they had been working in remotely from 
the UK. For example, in the vigilance ‘cell’, led by one of the party’s leading figures, Prashant 
Bhushan, which vetted prospective AAP candidates by investigating allegations of impropriety 
and corruption. Some activists saw the possibility of an AAP government after the 2014 
national election as a signal to end their sojourns in the UK as skilled professional migrants 
and return to serve the nation. However, the AAP won only 4 seats in Punjab in the face of an 
unprecedented BJP landslide in that election and so, unfortunately, some returns were put on 
hold. When volunteers did return to India to help though, as with Jainath, the evidence of their 
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commitment would be recorded, shared and folded back into the party’s social media feeds to 
be promoted by AAP supporters in the UK. 
Another example is the case of Kundan, an IT worker who I had met at the first AAP-
UK event that I attended in west London in the summer of 2013. Kundan returned 
‘permanently’ to India later in 2013 with the best wishes of his AAP-UK friends. A Facebook 
post from the time shows him smiling, standing at an airport in the UK draped in the Indian 
flag and wearing an AAP cap. The accompanying text congratulates him on his 
‘transformation’ from IAC activist to AAP supporter and now on his return to India to be a 
‘true soldier on the ground’. The post celebrates the ‘lakhs of rupees’ that Kundan had donated 
and raised for the party, even at times when he faced hardship himself, and in particular notes 
the donation of a blue Maruti WagonR car to the party, which had belonged to his wife in Delhi. 
The WagonR is a modest automobile and this one had gone on to become famous in its own 
right when Arvind Kejriwal started using it as his Chief Ministerial car, a symbol of his 
common touch and lack of ostentation, rather than accept a government vehicle.  
Apart from one chance encounter during election campaigning in Delhi in late 2013, I 
didn’t see Kundan again until the summer of 2015. But in the meantime, he had fallen out with 
the party very publicly. The initial euphoria at AAPs debut success in the 2013 Delhi assembly 
election had been tempered by the feeling that the party had overreached itself in the Lok Sabha 
election of 2014. As the party geared up to recontest the Delhi Assembly elections in 2015 
divisions had started to emerge about the ways in which candidates were chosen, in particular 
over the focus on “winnability”. That is, a candidate being chosen for their ability to command 
votes, perhaps through muscle power and influence, in a particular constituency (see Price and 
Ruud 2012), rather than for their ethical leadership and probity. In the news media these 
disputes were partly played out in the drama of the expulsion from the party in April 2015 of 
Yogendra Yadav and Prashant Bhushan, both leading intellectual figures within the AAP who 
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broke away to form a new movement, Swaraj Abhiyan, and later a new political party, Swaraj 
India1. For many volunteers in India and in the UK the AAP project seemed to have lost its 
moral compass. Rather than seeking to “change politics” it appeared to have taken up political 
business as usual in the search for power. 
In early April of 2015 Kundan had become so dissatisfied with the direction of the party 
that he posted a series of tweets in which, among other things, he had asked for the WagonR 
to be returned to him. Kundan later said that he had not actually expected the car to be returned, 
only that he wished to express his frustration. But the car had gained symbolic significance far 
beyond its material value as an emblem of Arvind Kejriwal’s commitment to ascetic simplicity. 
Thus, Kundan’s request was eagerly reported across the news media. He submitted to the 
attention of the cameras and was briefly famous. The backlash on social media from party 
supporters was immediate and intense. So, overwhelming that within a month or two Kundan 
had returned to the UK with his family.  
I met up with him to discuss these events in July 2015. Sitting together underneath the 
Brutalist towers of the Barbican in London he told me how the exposure had affected him. He 
had withdrawn from any digital connection to the party and closed his social media accounts 
as the abuse had become too much. He had even feared for his and his family’s safety. Referring 
to the deaths of Right to Information campaigners and whistleblowers who had exposed 
corruption and wrongdoing in political parties, he said that he and his family feared the power 
that politicians had to do harm. That he even suggested this possibility in relation to Kejriwal 
and the AAP was a sign of the depth of his disappointment with the party. He seemed quite 
shattered by the experience. Perhaps the hardest aspect of the affair for him to bear he said was 
the embarrassment at having been such an avid supporter of the party and having spent so much 
effort persuading others to support and donate funds. I asked if he was interested in following 
Yadav and Bhushan, and some of his fellow AAP-UK supporters into the Swaraj Abhiyan. He 
Millennial India: Aam Aadmi Party  
 
 
16 
said no, no more politics, he had had his ‘hands burnt’, although he remained committed to the 
core principle that corruption was holding India back. Kundan was not alone. Other AAP-UK 
activists also disengaged from the party at this time suspicious of its selection of candidates 
and concerned about the party’s attitude to transparency. While some chose to withdraw 
quietly, others felt compelled to actively express their dissatisfaction by posting critical videos 
and comments on social media. Jainath, the retired party supporter who had been celebrated on 
the AAP-UK YouTube feed for his commitment to campaigning began to publish videos online 
in which he expressed his extreme disillusionment with the party’s leadership, Arvind Kejriwal 
in particular, repeating demands that supporters should not donate to the party until a full list 
of donations is posted on the party’s website.  AAP HQ in Delhi, which administered the AAP-
UK Facebook account, responded to the growing online criticism in digital form by resetting 
the page and deleting the timeline of AAP-UK posts in the process. It was as if the party, 
represented on the ballot paper by an image of a broom, had swept clean part of its digital 
archive to prepare the space for the emergence of what an ongoing AAP-UK supporter, 
appropriately using the language of digital technology, described to me as ‘AAP 2.0’ (personal 
communication 2018). 
Conclusion 
What can we learn then from these accounts of digital engagement with anti-corruption politics 
in the diaspora? The AAP UK supporters appear enmeshed in digital circulations in two senses. 
First, as actors involved in the global circulation of text, images and narratives that comprise 
the ‘techno-moral’ rhetoric of the party (Bornstein and Sharma 2016) and offer a site through 
which action and personal ethical commitment can be demonstrated, and second, in many 
cases, as sojourning techno-professionals whose own global labor circulations are linked to the 
emergence of digital capitalism and the identities and hierarchies created by it.  In these stories 
of intense attachment to a cause facilitated by digital media, AAP UK supporters do not just 
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passively follow events but become actively involved in producing and recirculating content 
for their movement. In the process they refashion themselves as the aam aadmi, an ordinary, 
but active and engaged, citizen of India working to remake the nation from beyond its borders. 
At the same time, however, it is their identity as a khas (special) category of person/citizen, the 
educated, techno-professional, globally mobile NRI, that is presented as the factor that makes 
them particularly valuable to the party. This value is expressed instrumentally, as in the 
skillsets, system knowledge and team working practices that techno-professionals are imagined 
to bring to activist work, and discursively as NRI activists appear as aspirational avatars of 
India’s techno-modernity and global influence. Activities such as the international calling 
campaigns reflect both the class hierarchies found in contemporary global India and those 
implicit in the moral-pedagogical outreach missions to slum neighborhoods organized by 
middle class AAP activists during election campaigns in India (see Roy 2014, 51). In this sense, 
as Roy finds in AAP campaigning in India, the AAP-UK supporters group does not easily 
prefigure (Maeckelbergh 2011, 4) a future India free from hierarchy in the way that the use of 
the term aam aadmi suggests. 
The emergence of digital communication, and more recently social media, over the last 
two decades makes political participation possible in a way that it was not with earlier forms 
of long-distance nationalism. As Conversi notes for the phenomenon of “Yankee Hindutva”2, 
the virtual connectedness of diasporic techno-professionals to radical political formations in 
their home country is partly facilitated by self-introspection related to loneliness and a search 
for community (Conversi 2012, 1362). This is a sentiment familiar to me from my 
conversations with AAP-UK supporters and indicates the ways in which the connections and 
affects that underpin other forms of diasporic nationalism are present in global AAP supporter 
networks. In this sense the AAP-UK is not unusual as a form of digitally mediated long-
distance nationalism but remains a very useful site through which to explore alternative 
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understandings of pan-Indian nationalism, in counterpoint to the focus in the literature on 
diasporic Hindutva. In many ways the AAP-UK supporters are similar to their diasporic 
Hindutva supporting counterparts in the UK (see Zavos 2015) in terms of the reproduction of 
values and hierarchies based in discourses of pan-Indian class morality, moral and ethical 
reform of the state and society, and the imposition of streamlined and disciplined forms of 
governance (see Udupa 2014). In that respect it is worth noting that some ex AAP-UK 
supporters from Hindu backgrounds are now happy to support the BJP prime minister Narendra 
Modi as a strong leader with a positive agenda for governance reform while remaining 
suspicious of the party machine that he leads and of Indian politics in general.  And yet as a 
whole, AAP-UK supporters did, and still do, express opposition to the politics of communalism 
and in this sense, they do promote a politics which recognizes regional and religious differences 
subsumed under a greater pan Indian identity. Even as AAP-UK supporters negotiate regional 
and religious diasporic identities and spaces in the UK, Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, Punjabi, Bengali 
or Gujarati perhaps, the strength of the AAP-UK is that it offers a space, on and offline, in 
which these different identities are performed as equal. Perhaps more to the point is that located 
in the diaspora and very often working as techno-professionals what the AAP-UK supporters 
have in common is their class position as NRIs and the values that this places in education, 
professional qualifications, relative wealth, citizenship and mobility.  
Finally, there is the way in which digital mediation allows supporters a connection with 
the party both as consumers of party produced content and as participants in on and offline 
interactions. Utilizing digital platforms activists can inhabit a political space, an interactive 
‘media-scape’ (Appadurai 1996, 33) perhaps, in which they are active co-producers, whether 
this be attending an event at which a digital meeting with a party leader will be the highlight, 
or in the everyday work of sharing, and commenting ‘below the line’ on, mainstream media 
reports of events. As Bennet and Segerberg argue for movements such as Occupy, and the 15M 
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in Spain, the ideal of the aam aadmi provides an ‘action frame’ that can circulate globally when 
shared as personal stories across social media platforms (2012, 742). This work can bind 
supporters to the movement but also, as we see in the case of Kundan, can very quickly be used 
by those who, disillusioned, wish to speak out against the party, and in turn used to punish them 
for their transgression. Digital politics then is a means through which AAP supporters can 
practice political engagement and reimagine themselves as active citizens but also acts as a 
terrain on which morality and ethics are actively contested. 
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1 The detail of the arguments that led to the expulsion of Yadav and Bhushan and of the many 
accusations and counteraccusations of treachery, dictatorial leadership by Kejriwal, and 
moral failings by AAP candidates are too complicated to go into here.  
2 Ethno-nationalism amongst ‘Hindu-Americans’ in the US in support of political parties and 
non-governmental organisations pursuing a Hindu nationalist agenda 
                                                            
